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414

In Bowman v. Leverette, 1415 Justice McHugh was called upon to examine
the use of habeas corpus to challenge a conviction based upon prior federal and
state supreme court decisions that prohibited shifting the burden of proof on an
element of an offense to a defendant. The Bowman court held that
W.Va. Code, 53-4A-1(d) [1967] allows a petition for
post-conviction habeas corpus relief to advance contentions or
grounds which have been previously adjudicated only if those
contentions or grounds are based upon subsequent court decisions
which impose new substantive or procedural standards in criminal
1416
proceedings that are intended to be applied retroactively.
Bowman went on to address prior precedents on shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant and held that "[tihe decisions in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and State v. O'Connell, [163]
W.Va. [366], 7 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), do not require full retroactive
141
application.'
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Dye v. Bordenkircher 418 that "[w]hen
a stay of proceedings under W.Va. Code, 62-7-2 [1931], is in effect the proper
method of
seeking bail pending appeal is by a petition for habeas corpus to this
14 19
Court."

XXII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

Retroactive Application of ConstitutionalPronouncements

Justice McHugh indicated in Kincaid v. Mangum 1420 that "[w]hen this
Court issues an interpretation of the W.Va. Const. which was clearly not
foreshadowed, and when retroactive application of the new interpretation would
excessively burden the government's ability to carry out
its functions, then the new
42
constitutional interpretation will apply prospectively." 1 1

1414

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1415

289 S.E.2d 435 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1416
1417

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1418

284 S.E.2d 863 (W. Va. 1981).

1419
1420

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
432 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1993).

1421

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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Article 8 West VirginiaSupreme Courtof Appeals
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Crabtreev. Hash1422 that
W.Va. Const. art. VIII, §§ 3 and 8, and all administrative rules
made pursuant to the powers derived from article VIII, supersede
W.Va. Code, 51-2-10 [1931] and vest the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia with the sole power
to appoint a judge for temporary
service in any situation which
142
requires such an appointment. 1

Justice McHugh said in Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia
State Bar v. Karl1424 that
[p]ursuant to article VIII, section 8 of the West Virginia
Constitution, this Court has the inherent and express authority to
"prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules prescribing a
judicial code of ethics, and a code of regulations and standards of
conduct and performances for justices, judges and magistrates,
1425
along with sanctions and penalties for any violation thereof[.]'
C.

Article 3, Section 14 Speedy Trial

In State ex reL Shorter v. Hey, 1426 the court clarified a defendant's right to
a speedy trial pursuant to the constitution and by statute. Justice McHugh held that
[w]hereas W.Va. Code, 62-3-1, provides a defendant with a
statutory right to a trial in the term of his indictment, it is W.Va.
Code, 62-3-21, rather than W.Va. Code, 62-3-1, which is the
legislative adoption or declaration of what ordinarily constitutes a
speedy trial within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. VI and
§ 14.1427
W.Va. Const., art. m11,

1422

376 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1988).

1423

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2.

1424

449 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1994).

1425
1426

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (alteration in original).
294 S.E.2d 51 (W. Va. 1981).

1427

Id at Syl. Pt 1.
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Article 10, Section 4 ContractingDebt

In Devon Corp. v. Miller,1428 Justice McHugh addressed the effect of the
Contract Clause contained in Article 3, Section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution
and Article I of the United States Constitution. The court in Devon ruled:
The clauses of the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of West Virginia which forbid the passage of a law
impairing the obligation of a contract are not applicable to a
statute enacted prior to the making of a contract. Specifically, an
oil and gas lease obtained subsequent to the enactment of W.Va.
Code, 22-4A-7(b)(4), which statute requires an operator to obtain
the written consent and easement of surface owners prior to the
drilling or operation of 1429
a deep well, is not unconstitutionally
impaired by such statute.
Justice McHugh stated in State ex rel. Dadismanv. Caperton1430 that
[t]he 1990 amendment to W.Va. Code, 5-10-28 eliminating, for
most accounting purposes, the two divisions of the Public
Employees Retirement System previously existing only for such
purposes, specifically, the state division and the public employer
division, does not constitute an unconstitutional impairment of the
contractual rights of the former public employer division's
beneficiaries
or retirants, for the System has always owned all of
1431
the assets.
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Marockie v. Wagoner

432

that

[t]he school building debt service fund, described in W.Va. Code,
29-22-18 [1994] as consisting of monies allocated from the net
profits of the West Virginia Lottery, may be used to liquidate the
School Building Authority's revenue bonds. This method of
funding the School Building Authority's revenue bonds does not
violate section 4 of article X of the West Virginia Constitution
since the monies allocated to the school building debt service fund
are a new revenue source and since the legislature specifically
provided in W.Va. Code, 29-22-18 [1990 and 1994] that the net

1428

280 S.E.2d 108 (W. Va. 1981).

1429

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1430
1431

413 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1432

446 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1994).
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profits from the West Virginia Lottery are not to be treated as part
of the general revenue of the State.' 4a3
E.

Article 6, Section 30 One ObjectRule

Justice McHugh was called upon to explain the one object rule legislation
provision in the state constitution in the case of Kincaidv. Mangum.14 The court
held:
If there is a reasonable basis for the grouping of various matters in
a legislative bill, and if the grouping will not lead to logrolling or
other deceiving tactics, then the one-object rule in W.Va. Const.
art. VI, § 30 is not violated; however, the use of an omnibus bill to
authorize legislative rules violates the one-object rule found in
W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 30 because the use of the omnibus bill to
authorize legislative rules can lead to logrolling or other deceiving
tactics." F.

Article 10, Section 8 Bonded Debt

In State ex rel. Council of City of Charlestonv. Hall,1'16 Justice McHugh
indicated that "W.Va. Const. art. X, § 8 does not preclude a contract for a term of
twenty-five years whereby a city is obligated to pay a fee for solid waste disposal
when that fee comes from a special fund collected by the city for such solid waste
disposal." 1437 It was further held:
The provisions of an agreement which provide a city the option of
buying back improvements made to its solid waste facility at
certain years of the agreement or when the City chooses to
prematurely terminate the agreement, do not violate W.Va. Const.
art. X, § 8 or W.Va. Code, 11-8-26 [1963] since the City decides
when or if it will buy back the improvements to the solid waste
facility. However, if the City chooses to buy back the
improvements made to the solid waste facility it must do so
without violating W.Va. Const. art. X, § 8 or W.Va. Code, 11-8-26
[1963].1438

143

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1434

432 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1993).

1435

d. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1436

441 S.E.2d 386 (W. Va. 1994).

1437

1l at Syl. Pt. 1.

1438

lMat Syl. Pt. 2.
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Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. County Commision of Boone County
v. Cooke1439 that

[w]hen tax increment obligations are issued pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 7-11B-l, et seq. [1995], The Tax Increment Financing Act,
to finance a county development project authorized therein, a debt
is created within the meaning of article X, § 8 of the Constitution
of West Virginia and such tax increment obligations may only be
issued in accordance with article X, § 8." ' 44 0
The court went on to hold that
[t]he issuance of tax increment obligations pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 7-11B-l, et seq. [1995], The Tax Increment Financing Act,
is not in accordance with W.Va. Const. art. X, § 8 because W.Va.
Code, 7-11B-1, et seq. [1995] does not provide "for the collection
of a direct annual tax on all taxable property therein, in the ratio,
as between the several classes or types of such taxable property,
specified in section one of this article [W. Va. Const. art. X, § 1],
separate and apart from and in addition to all other taxes for all
other purposes" in order to pay the principal of and interest on
such
tax
increment
obligations
and is,
therefore,
441
unconstitutional.1
G.

Article 3, Section 6 Search and Seizure

Justice McHugh examined the constitutional issue of privacy, vis-a-vis an
44 2
automobile, in State v. Peacher.1
The court noted initially that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article III, Section 6, of the
West Virginia Constitution protect an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy."1443 Justice McHugh then went on to find that
[a]n individual's expectation of privacy in his automobile is less
than that which he would have in his home or his place of
business. The expectation of privacy associated with the exterior
aspects of an automobile is even less than that associated with the
interior portions. And, where an automobile is parked on a third
person's property, after control had been relinquished to yet
1439

475 S.E.2d 483 (W. Va. 1996).

1440

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1441

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1442

280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981).

1443

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
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another person, and the automobile is open to view from a public
highway, any possible expectation of privacy regarding the
exterior aspects of the automobile is even further diminished. 1444
Justice McHugh relied on the decision in State v. Plantz'445 to hold in State
446 that
v. Wimer
[t]he general rule is that the voluntary consent of a person who
owns or controls premises to a search of such premises is
sufficient to authorize such search without a search warrant, and
that a search of such premises, without a warrant, when consented
to, does not violate the constitutional
prohibition against
447
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Justice McHugh was concerned with the issue of a warrantless search and
seizure by public school officials in State v. Joseph T.144 8 The court initially held
that "[p]ublic school students in West Virginia are entitled under U.S. Const.
amend. IV and W.Va. Const. art. III, § 6, to security against unreasonable searches
and seizures conducted in the schools by school principals, teachers and other
school authorities." 144 9 The court then held that
[i]n determining whether a warrantless search concerning a public
school student conducted by school authorities is reasonable under
U.S. Const. amend. IV and W.Va. Const. art. III, § 6, in the
context of delinquency or criminal proceedings instituted against
the student, the search is to be assessed in view not only of the
rights of the public school student but also in view of the need of
this State's educational system to prevent disruptive or illegal
conduct by public school students; in particular, the search must
be reasonable in terms of (1) the initial justification for the search
and (2) the extent of the search conducted; the initial justification
for the search is determined by the "reasonable suspicion
standard" (a standard less exacting than "probable cause") under
which a search is justified where school authorities have
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will reveal
evidence that the student violated the rules of the school or the
law; the extent of the search conducted is reasonable when

1444

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

1445

180 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1971).
284 S.E.2d 890 (W. Va. 1981).

1446
1447

lad
at Syl. Pt. 2.

1448

336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).

1449

Id,at Syl. Pt. 2.
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reasonably related to the objective
of the search and not
1450
excessively intrusive to the student.
Justice McHugh concluded Joseph T. by holding:
Where an assistant principal of a public school had reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the locker of a public school student
contained an alcoholic beverage in violation of the rules of the
school, and a warrantless search of the student's locker revealed a
number of marihuana cigarettes, the search, in the context of
delinquency or criminal proceedings instituted against the student,
did not constitute a violation of the student's right under U.S.
Const. amend. IV and W.Va. Const. art. 45III,
§ 6, to security
1
against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The case of State v. Choat1452 challenged the constitutionality of the stop
and frisk procedure. Justice McHugh stated initially that "[w]here a police officer
observes several individuals in a high-crime vicinity during the early morning
hours and has reason to believe at least one of those individuals is violating a city
ordinance, an investigatory stop conducted by the police officers is constitutionally
permissible.' ' 1453 The court then set out guidelines for conducting a stop and frisk:
Where a police officer making a lawful investigatory stop has
reason to believe that an individual is armed and dangerous, that
officer, in order to protect himself and others, may conduct a search
for concealed weapons, regardless of whether he has probable cause
to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be certain
that the individual is armed; the inquiry is whether a reasonably
prudent man would be warranted
in the belief that his safety or that
1454
of others was endangered.
H.

Article 3, Section 14 Right to Counsel

Relying on State v. Thomas,1455 Justice McHugh addressed the
constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases in State v. Baker.1456 The court in
Baker held:
1450

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1451

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1452

363 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1987).

1453

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1454

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1455

203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).

1456

287 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1982).
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In the determination of a claim that an accused was prejudiced by
ineffective assistance of counsel violative of Article I, Section
14 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, courts should measure and
compare the questioned counsel's performance by whether he
exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by
attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law,
except that proved counsel error which does not affect the
outcome of the case, will be regarded as harmless error."5
Justice McHugh continued in Baker by holding that "[w]here a counsel's
performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy,
tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively
assistive of his client's interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney
would have so acted in the defense of an accused."' 145 8
In State ex reL Levitt v. Bordenkircher,1459 the defendant alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel during his criminal prosecution. Justice McHugh
responded to the claim as follows:
A defendant in a criminal case, whose voluntary tape recorded
confession to police authorities indicated that he was guilty of
murder of the first degree under the West Virginia "felony-murder
rule," who entered a plea of guilty to murder of the first degree
and received a sentence of life imprisonment, without a
recommendation of mercy, failed to demonstrate that his
conviction and sentence resulted from ineffective assistance of
counsel, where his counsel (1) filed various pre-trial motions upon
the defendant's behalf, including motions to discover the nature of
the State's evidence, (2) evaluated the strength of the evidence
against the defendant and met with the defendant upon several
occasions prior to recommending the guilty plea and (3) attempted
to mitigate the defendant's sentence by eliciting testimony from
witnesses who stated that the defendant "turned himself in,"
helped the authorities locate a revolver used during
the crime, and
146 0
would, in time, be a good candidate for parole.
Justice McHugh held in State v. Glover 148' that "[i]nexperience alone does

1457

ad at Syl. Pt. 4.

1458

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1459

342 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1986).

1460

a at Syl. Pt. 5.

1461

355 S.E.2d 631 (W. Va. 1987).
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not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." 1462 The court also ruled:
Ineffective assistance of counsel is established when it is proved
that counsel for a criminal defendant failed to investigate
adequately a purported alibi defense and consequently failed to
contact, subpoena and call alibi witnesses who were willing and
able to testify for the defendant in a case in which the alibi
was the
1463
defendant's sole possible defense or a material defense.
L

Article 3, Section 4 Ex Post Facto

In Shumate v. West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles,14 64 Justice
McHugh said:
[i]t is not a violation of the ex post facto clauses, U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10, and W. Va. Const. art. III, § 4, to apply the provisions of
W.Va. Code, chapter 17C, article 5A, as amended, to persons
whose license to operate a motor vehicle has previously been
suspended or revoked
pursuant to W.Va. Code, chapter 17C,
1465
article 5, as amended.
The opinion concluded that "[t]he ex post facto clauses of the United
States Constitution, article I, section 10, and the West Virginia Constitution, article
III, section 4, do not apply to administrative proceedings for
which the purpose is
466
to suspend or revoke a license to operate a motor vehicle." 1
In State ex rel. Collins v. Bedel1467 Justice McHugh ruled that
[a] procedural change in a criminal proceeding does not violate
the ex post facto principle found in the W.Va. Const. art. III, § 4
and in the U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 unless the procedural change
alters the definition of a crime so that what is currently punished
as a crime was an innocent act when committed; deprives the
accused of a defense which existed when the crime was
committed; 1or
increases the punishment for the crime after it was
468
committed.

1462

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1463

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1464

392 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va.1990).

1465

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1466

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1467

460 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1995).

1468

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
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Article 3, Section 10 Equal Protection

Justice McHugh was concerned with the constitutional impact of a statute
that limited funds for certain counties in State ex rel. Board of Educationfor Grant
County v. Manchin.146 9 Justice McHugh stated that
W.Va. Code, 18A-4-5 [1985], to the extent that it fixes a county's
entitlement to state equity funding based upon whether an excess
levy was in effect in that particular county on January 1, 1984, and
continues to limit that county's funding to the specific amount
awarded on January 1, 1984, despite the fact that the county's
voters subsequently rejected continuation of the levy at the polls,
violates equal protection principles because such a financing
system operates to treat counties which never passed excess levies
more favorably than those which had excess
levies in effect on
1470
January 1, 1984, but failed to renew them.
Justice McHugh determined the constitutionality of a criminal statute in
the Public Employees Insurance Act, in the case of Courtney v. State Departmentof
Health of West Virginia.'47' The court held that the statute, "W.Va. Code, 5-16-12
[1988] does not violate equal protection principles contained in article 1III,
472 sections
10 & 17 or in article VI, section 39 of the West Virginia Constitution.'
In Lewis v. CanaanValley Resorts, Inc., 473 Justice McHugh held:
The West Virginia Skiing Responsibility Act, W.Va. Code,
20-3A-1 to 20-3A-8 [1984], which immunizes ski area operators
from tort liability for the inherent risks in the sport of skiing which
are essentially impossible for the operators to eliminate, does not
violate equal protection principles of article III, section 10 of the
Constitution of West Virginia or of the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. The Act similarly does not
constitute special legislation in violation
of article VI, section 39
1 4 74
of the Constitution of West Virginia.

In the case of Pritchardv. Arvon,1475 Justice McHugh held that

1469

366 S.E.2d 743 (W. Va. 1988).

1470

Id.at SyI. Pt. 3.

1471

388 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1989).

1472

Id.at Syl. Pt. 5.

1473

408 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1991).

1474

Id.at Syl. Pt. 3.

1475

413 S.E.2d 100 (W. Va. 1991).
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W.Va. Code, 29-12A-16(d) [1986], which provides that the
purchase of liability insurance or the establishment of an
insurance program by a political subdivision does not constitute a
waiver of any immunity or defense of the political subdivision or
its employees, does not violate equal protection principles as set
forth in W.Va. Const. art. m, § 10.1476
147 7

Justice McHugh held in Randall v. Fairmont City Police Department
that "[t]he qualified tort immunity provisions of the West Virginia Governmental
Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act of 1986, W.Va. Code, 29-12A-1 to
29-12A-18, do not violate the equal 478
protection principles of article I, section 10 of
the Constitution of West Virginia." 1
147 9
In State ex rel. Lambert v. County Commission of Boone County,
Justice McHugh stated:
The provision of W.Va. Code, 5-16-22 [1992], which requires
employers, whether or not they elect to participate in the Public
Employees Insurance Agency, to contribute to the Public
Employees Insurance Agency if they participate in the Public
Employees Retirement System and their retired employees elect to
participate in the Public Employees Insurance Agency, does not
violate the equal protection principle found in West Virginia
Constitution art. IIl, Sec. 10, which is West Virginia's due process
clause. Such provision relates to a legitimate governmental
purpose of providing medical coverage to retired employees
who
148 0
participate in the Public Employees Retirement System.
Justice McHugh ruled in Wetzel County Solid Waste Authority v. West
Virginia Division of NaturalResources148 1 that
[t]he equal protection and due process rights found in W.Va.
Const. art. III, § 10 are not violated by the imposition of the solid
waste assessment fee as set forth in W.Va. Code, 7-5-22 [1990]
because the imposition of the solid waste assessment fee is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of
defraying the administrative costs of the regional or county solid
waste authorities and their solid waste programs. Furthermore, the

1476

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

1477

412 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1991).

1478

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

1479

452 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1994).

1480

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
462 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1995).

1481
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imposition of the solid waste assessment fee is neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory.' 482
Justice McHugh ruled in Payne v. Gundy1483 that

[i]t is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article
Il, section 10, of the Constitution of West Virginia for a party in a
civil action to purposefully eliminate potential jurors from a jury
through the use of peremptory strikes solely upon the basis of
gender. 14
The court then held:
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful gender discrimination
in the jury selection process through the use of peremptory strikes,
the party moving to disqualify the jury must show: (1) that the
opposing party has exercised peremptory strikes to eliminate
potential jurors of the movant's gender, and (2) that the
circumstances raise an inference that the opposing party used the
peremptory strikes to exclude from the jury potential jurors solely
upon the basis of their gender. The opposing party may defeat a
prima facie case of such unlawful discrimination by providing
non-discriminatory, credible reasons for using the peremptory
strikes to eliminate members of the moving party's gender from
the jury. Although the reasons or explanations of the opposing
party for striking members of the moving party's gender from the
jury need not rise to the level of a "for cause" challenge, the trial
court has the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon the
motion to disqualify
the jury because of unlawful gender
1485
discrimination.

Justice McHugh wrote in State ex reL Blankenship v. Richardson14 6 that
W.Va. Code, 23-4-6(n)(1) [1995], which provides that in order to
be eligible to apply for an award of permanent total disability
benefits, a claimant must have been awarded the sum of fifty
percent in prior permanent partial disability awards or have
suffered an occupational injury or disease which results in a
1482

kd at Syl. Pt. 6.

1483

468 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 1996).

1484

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1485

Id at Syl. Pt. 5.

1488

474 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1996).
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finding that the claimant has suffered a medical impairment of
W.Va. Const. Art. I, § 10, our
fifty percent, does not 1violate
487
equal protection clause.
K.

Article 3, Section 22 Right To BearArms

Justice McHugh was concerned with legislative intrusion in to the state
constitutional right to keep and bear arms in the case of State ex rel. City of
Princeton v. Buckner.148 8 Jusice McHugh held that
W.Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975], the statutory proscription against
carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon, is overbroad and violative
of article III, section 22 of the West Virginia Constitution, known
as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms Amendment." It infringes
upon the right of a person to bear arms for defensive purposes,
specifically, defense of self, family, home and state, insofar as it
prohibits the carrying of a dangerous or deadly weapon for any
purpose without a license or other statutory authorization. 48 9
Justice McHugh noted in Buckner that
[t]he West Virginia legislature may, through the valid exercise of
its police power, reasonably regulate the right of a person to keep
and bear arms in order to promote the health, safety and welfare of
all citizens of this State, provided that the restrictions or
regulations imposed do not frustrate the constitutional freedoms
guaranteed by article III, section 22 of the West Virginia
Constitution, known as the "Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Amendment."149 °
L.

Article 3, Section 7 Free Speech

The right of a citizen to speak while a police officer issues a traffic ticket
to another person was addressed by Justice McHugh in State ex rel. Wilmoth v.
Gustke.149' The court held that
[a] person, upon witnessing a police officer issuing a traffic
citation to a third party on the person's property, who asks the
Syl. Pt. 5.

1487

Id. at

1488

377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988).

1489

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1490

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1491

373 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1988).
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officer, without the use of fighting or insulting words or other
opprobrious language and without forcible or other illegal
hindrance, to leave the premises, does not violate W.Va. Code,
61-5-17 [1931], because that person has not illegally hindered an
officer of this State in the lawful exercise of his or her duty. To
hold otherwise would create first amendment implications
which
492
may violate the person's right to freedom of speech.
Justice McHugh held in Wheeling Park Commission v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, InternationalUnion, AFL-CIO1493 that
[w]hen evaluating whether an injunction's content-neutral
restrictions on a person's or group's speech in a public forum is
constitutional pursuant to W.Va. Const. art. III, § 7, the freedom
of speech provision, as opposed to evaluating a content-neutral
statute, ordinance or regulation, the standard time, place, and
manner analysis of the restrictions is not sufficiently rigorous.
Instead, a court must ensure that the content-neutral restrictions in
the injunction burden no more 494
speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest.
Justice McHugh examined the impact of mandatory disclosure .of certain
matters on the right to free speech in the case of State ex rel. Hechler v. Christian
Action Network.1495 The court held:
Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 29-19-8 [1992] of the Solicitation of
Charitable Funds Act all charitable organizations must include the
following statement on every printed solicitation: "'West Virginia
residents may obtain a summary of the registration and financial
documents from the Secretary of State, State Capitol, Charleston,
West Virginia 25305. Registration does not imply endorsement."'
The mandated statement does not violate the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States or article III, section 7 of the
Constitution of West Virginia because it burdens no more speech
than is necessary to further the substantial state interest of
"prevent[ing] deceptive and dishonest statements and conduct in
the solicitation
and reporting of funds for or in the name of
1 4 96
charity."'

1492

Ild.
at Syl.

1493

479 S.E.2d 876 (W. Va. 1996).

1494

Id.
at Syl. Pt. 2.

1495

491 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1997).

1496

Id at Syl. Pt. 6 (alteration in original).
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The court further said that "[a]n organization which 'holds itself out to be
a[n] ... educational . . .organization' is a 'charitable organization' within the

meaning of W.Va. Code, 29-19-2(1) [1992] of the Solicitation of Charitable Funds
Act and, thus, is subject to the requirements of that Act." 1497 The court concluded
that "W.Va. Code, 29-19-8 [1992] does not authorize the Secretary of State to
require charitable organizations149to8 submit to his office copies of any solicitation
materials mailed to the public.'
M.

Article 3, Section 15 Free Exercise
Justice McHugh indicated in Matter of Kilpatrick1499 that
[t]he free exercise clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution and art. III, § 15 of the West Virginia
Constitution are not violated by the provision of W.Va. Code,
48-1-6 [1986] requiring a standard serological test before a license
for marriage will be issued, because this statutory provision
furthers the compelling
interests in the health and welfare of the
1500
citizens of this State.

N.

Article 6, Section 36 Lottery

The constitutional lottery provision was the subject of interpretation by
Justice McHugh in State ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan.150 1 It was said
initially in the opinion:
Article VI, section 36 of the West Virginia Constitution provides
an exception to the prohibition against lotteries to allow the
operation of a lottery which is regulated, controlled, owned and
operated by the State of West Virginia in the manner provided by
general law. Only those lottery operations which are regulated,
controlled, owned and operated in the manner provided by general
laws enacted by the West Virginia Legislature may be properly
conducted in accordance with the 15exception
created under article
02
VI, section 36 of our Constitution.
The Polan court then held:
1497

Id. at Syl. PL 5 (alterations in original).

1498

Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.

1499
1500

375 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1988).
Id. at Syl.

1501

438 S.E.2d 308 (W. Va. 1993).

1502

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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In order for a delegation of authority by the legislature to an
administrative agency to be constitutional, the legislature must
prescribe adequate statutory standards to guide the agency in the
administration of the statute, and not grant the agency unbridled
authority in the exercise of the power conferred upon it. A general
delegation of authority by the legislature to the Lottery
Commission under W.Va. Code, 29-22-9(b)(2) [1990], authorizing
it to promulgate rules and regulations with regard to "electronic
video lottery systems," is clearly not a sufficient statutory
standard which would vest the Lottery Commission with power to
include electronic gaming devices, such as electronic video
lottery, as part of the operations of the state lottery. To hold
otherwise would result in an unlawful delegation of legislative
power to the Lottery Commission and
would violate article VI, §
503
36 of the West Virginia Constitution.'

0.

Article 12, Section 2 Free Schools

Justice McHugh interpreted the constitutional authority of the state board
of education in West VirginiaBoardof Educationv. Hechler.'s°4 The court held:
Rule-making by the State Board of Education is within the
meaning of "general supervision" of state schools pursuant to art.
XII, § 2 of the West Virginia Constitution, and any statutory
provision that interferes with such rule-making is unconstitutional.
Consequently, W.Va. Code, 29A-3A-12 and -13 [1988] are hereby
declared to be unconstitutional.15 05
The court also stated in Hechler that
[a] rule adopted by the State Board of Education, setting forth
minimum requirements for the design and equipment of school
buses, is within the meaning of "general supervision" of state
schools pursuant to art. XII, § 2 of the West Virginia Constitution.
W.Va. Code, 29A-3A-12 and -13 [1988] interfere with such
"general supervision," and, therefore, are unconstitutional. 50 6

1503

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1504

376 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 1988).

1505

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1506

l. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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Article 3, Section 17 CertainRemedy
In Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 5 °7 Justice McHugh held that

"[the West Virginia Skiing Responsibility Act, W. Va. Code, 20-3A-1 to 20-3A-8
[1984], does not violate the certain remedy provision of article III, section 17 of the
Constitution of West Virginia."' 508 The court also held that
[w]hen legislation either substantially impairs vested rights or
severely limits existing procedural remedies permitting court
adjudication, thereby implicating the certain remedy provision of
article III, section 17 of the Constitution of West Virginia, the
legislation will be upheld under that provision if, first, a
reasonably effective alternative remedy is provided by the
legislation or, second, if no such alternative remedy is provided,
the purpose of the alteration or repeal of the existing cause of
action or remedy is to eliminate or curtail a clear social or
economic problem, and the alteration or repeal of the existing
cause of action or remedy is a reasonable method of achieving
such purpose.15 °9
In Pritchardv. Arvon, 1510 Justice McHugh held that
W.Va. Code, 29-12A-5(b) [1986], which provides immunity for an
employee of a political subdivision under some circumstances,
does not violate the certain remedy provision of W.Va. Const. art.
III, § 17, nor does it violate equal protection principles as
contained in W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10.'5"
In Randall v. FairmontCity Police Department,1512 Justice McHugh stated
that "[t]he qualified tort immunity provisions of the West Virginia Governmental
Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act of 1986, W.Va. Code, 29-12A-1 to
provision of article III, section 17 of
29-12A-18, do not violate the certain
15 remedy
the Constitution of West Virginia." 13

1507

408 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1991).

1508

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1509

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

1510

413 S.E.2d 100 (W. Va. 1991).

1511

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1512

412 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1991).

1513

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Article 10, Section I Taxation

The issue of disproportionate tax assessment was addressed by Justice
McHugh in the case of Petitionof Maple Meadow Mining Co. for Relieffrom Real
PropertyAssessmentfor Tax Year 1992.1514 The court held that
[a] taxpayer's right to equal and uniform taxation under article X,
section I of the West Virginia Constitution and equal protection of
the laws under amendment XIV, section 1 of the United States
Constitution is not violated when a certain class of property of that
taxpayer is assessed at a higher percentage than certain other
classes of property of other taxpayers within the three-year period
of achieving equality of assessed property valuation pursuant to
W.Va. Code, ll-IC-1, et seq. Accordingly, article X, section 1 of
the West Virginia Constitution and amendment XIV, section 1 of
the United States Constitution is satisfied when general
adjustments are utilized over a short period of time to equalize the
differences existing among taxpayers regarding property valuation
and assessments. 51 5
In Wetzel County Solid Waste Authority v. West Virginia Division of
Natural Resources1516 Justice McHugh distinguished a regulatory fee from a tax.
The court held that
[t]he solid waste assessment fee authorized by W.Va. Code, 7-5-22
[1990] is a regulatory fee rather than a tax since the revenue from
the fee is used for the sole purpose of defraying the costs of the
administration of duties imposed upon the county or regional solid
waste authorities. Therefore, W.Va. Code, 7-5-22 [1990] does not
violate W.Va. Const. art. V, § 1, by impermissibly delegating
taxing authority to the county or regional solid waste authorities
nor does it violate W.Va. Const. art. X, § 1, which requires
5 17
taxation to be equal and uniform throughout the State.'
Justice McHugh ruled in City of Huntington v. Bacon1 518 that
[a]n ordinance which imposes a municipal service fee pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 8-13-13 [1971] upon the owners of buildings at an
1514

446 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1994).

1515

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1516

462 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1995).

1517

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1518

473 S.E.2d 743 (W. Va. 1996).
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annual rate plus a percentage based upon the square footage of
space contained in each structure on the lot for the sole purpose of
defraying the cost of fire and flood protection services is a user fee
rather than a tax and therefore, is not in violation of the Tax
Limitation Amendment found in W. Va. Const. Art. X, § 1.1519
R.

Article 6, Section 52 Road Funds

Justice McHugh was called upon in ContractorsAss'n of West Virginia v.
West Virginia Department of Public Safety, Division of Public Safety 1520 to explain
the constitutional road fund provision. The court held that
[t]he only purposes for which the funds described in W.Va. Const.
art. VI, § 52 may be spent are for the "cost of administration and
collection" and for the cost of "construction, reconstruction,
repair and maintenance of public highways." The term "cost of
administration" includes the cost of administering the duties of
the Division of Motor Vehicles. The term "maintenance" includes
the following activities which are directly related to ensuring the
safety of our public highways: the road patrol, traffic, and traffic
court activities of the Department of Public Safety; and the
motorcycle safety and licensing program, but the term
"maintenance" will not be construed to include activities which
are remotely connected to highway safety such as the construction
and operation of police barracks.1521
Justice McHugh also ruled that
[t]he reimbursements by the Division of Motor Vehicles to the
Department of Public Safety for the following activities: road
patrol, traffic, traffic court, operator examinations, and assistance
to the Division of Motor Vehicles with its administrative duties
are authorized by W.Va. Code, 15-2-12(i) [1990] because the
above activities are "related" to the duties of the Division of
Motor Vehicles since the Department of Public Safety is
which the
responsible for enforcing traffic laws and regulations1522
Division of Motor Vehicles has the duty to administer.

1519

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

1520

434 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1993).

1521

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1522

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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Article 3, Sections 10 and 14 Due Process

Justice McHugh expressed concern with the extent to which law
enforcement officials could use an informant to infringe upon the rights of a
defendant in State v. Leadingham.523 The court held that
[u]nder the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article II, § 10 of the West Virginia
Constitution, due process and fundamental fairness dictate that the
police and the prosecuting attorney be precluded from using an
undercover informant to penetrate the clinical environment of a
psychiatric institution in order to elicit incriminating statements
from a defendant who is undergoing a court-ordered psychiatric
evaluation. Any incriminating statements elicited from a
defendant under these circumstances, upon proper motion by the
defendant, shall be suppressed in the trial on1524
the criminal charges
to which the incriminating statements relate.
The case of State v. Blair525 involved the criminal prosecution of a water
company executive under a statute challenged as being void for vagueness. Justice
McHugh wrote:
W.Va. Code, 24-3-1 [1923] is unconstitutionally vague in
violation of W.Va. Const. art. HI, §§ 10 and 14 because the
language "establish and maintain adequate and suitable facilities"
and "perform such service... as shall be reasonable, safe and
sufficient for the security and convenience of the public, and the
safety and comfort of its employees" does not provide adequate
standards for adjudication or set forth 52with
sufficient definiteness
6
the specific acts which are prohibited.'
In State ex rel. Collins v. Bedell, 527 Justice McHugh said that "[a]
defendant's due process rights set forth in the W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10 and the
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 are not violated when a non-lawyer magistrate
presides over the trial
because W.Va. Code, 50-5-13 [1994] provides meaningful
528
review on appeal." 1

1523

438 S.E.2d 825 (W. Va. 1993).

1524

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

1525

438 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1993).

1526

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).

1527

460 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1995).

.1528

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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Justice McHugh held in State v. Kelley1529 that

[a] defendant's constitutional rights to due process and trial by a
fair and impartial jury, pursuant to amendment VI and amendment
XIV, section 1 of the United States Constitution and article III,
sections 10 and 14 of the West Virginia Constitution are violated
as0 a bailiff and
when a sheriff, in a defendant's trial, serves 153
testifies as a key witness for the State in that trial.
Justice McHugh indicated in State v. Farmer531 that
[p]ursuant to West Virginia's kidnapping statute set forth in W.Va.
Code, 61-2-14a [1965], a trial judge, for purposes of imposing a
sentence on a defendant for a term of years not less than twenty or
a sentence for a term of years not less than ten, has the discretion
to make findings as to whether a defendant inflicted bodily harm
on a victim and as to whether ransom, money, or any other
concession has been paid or yielded for the return of the victim.
Because the findings by the trial judge are made solely for the
purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed on a defendant
and are not elements of the crime of kidnapping, West Virginia
due
Constitution art. III, §§ 10 and 14, relating to a defendant's
1532
process rights and right to a trial by jury, are not violated.
In State v. Jenkins,1533 Justice McHugh was concerned with the impact of
due process on the admissibility of evidence generally. The court held that
[w]hile ordinarily rulings on the admissibility of evidence are
largely within the trial judge's sound discretion, a trial judge may
not make an evidentiary ruling which deprives a criminal
defendant of certain rights, such as the right to examine witnesses
against him or her, to offer testimony in support of his or her
defense, and to be represented by counsel, which are essential for
a fair trial pursuant to the due process clause found in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
and article III, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution.' 534

1529

451 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1994).

1530

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1531

454 S.E.2d 378 (W. Va. 1994).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

1532

1533
1534

466 S.E.2d 471 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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In State ex rel. White v. Todt,1' Justice McHugh addressed the nature of
due process that must be afforded a dangerous or potentially dangerous person who
escaped from a mental institution in another state. The opinion noted as a general
matter that "[t]he due process clause found in article Ell, § 10 of the Constitution of
West Virginia requires that laws provide explicit standards for those who apply
1536
them so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the laws."
Justice McHugh then held that
[w]hen a dangerous or potentially dangerous patient who has
escaped from a mental health facility in another state is being
detained in this State pursuant to article V of the Interstate
Compact on Mental Health found in W.Va. Code, 27-14-1 [1957],
the due process clause found in article III, § 10 of the Constitution
of West Virginia requires, at a minimum, that before this State
returns the dangerous or potentially dangerous patient to the state
from where he or she has escaped, the dangerous or potentially
dangerous patient be informed of the reason he or she is being
detained, the dangerous or potentially dangerous patient be
afforded a hearing to determine identification and the dangerous
or potentially dangerous patient be afforded the opportunity to
have the representation of counsel in the event he or she decides to
challenge the identification. 15 7
Justice McHugh was concerned with the due process impact of workers'
compensation legislation on injured workers in State ex rel. Blankenship v.
Richardson.1538 The court observed initially that "[t]hough a workers'
compensation statute, or amendment thereto, may be construed to operate
retroactively where mere procedure is involved, such a statute or amendment may
not be so construed where, to do so, would impair a substantive right." 153 9 The
court then held that
[w]here a workers' compensation claimant has been previously
awarded permanent partial disability benefits that would have
entitled the claimant to file for permanent total disability review,
legislation that attempts to immediately preclude the claimant's
substantive right to seek such review prior to the expiration of the
ordinary ninety days provided in W.Va. Const. Art. VI, § 30,
violates principles of fundamental fairness embodied in the due

1535

475 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 1996).

1535

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

1537

Ila at Syl. Pt. 3.

1538

474 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1996).

1539

Id. at Syl. PL 6.
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process provisions of W.Va, Const. Art. III, § 10.'540
Justice McHugh wrote in State ex rel. Hechler v. Christian Action
Network 54l that "[t]he due process clause found in article III, § 10 of the
Constitution of West Virginia requires that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he or she
' 1542
may act accordingly.
T.

Article 3, Section 14 Right to Jury Trial
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Collins v. Bedell1 43 that
W.Va. Code, 50-5-13 [1994], which sets forth the appeal
procedure in a criminal proceeding from magistrate court to
circuit court, but which does not give the defendant a statutory
right to a jury trial de novo on the appeal to circuit court, does not
violate W.Va. Const. art. III, § 14 or art. VIII, § 10.1544

Justice McHugh addressed the constitutionality of the state's criminal
abuse and neglect statute in the case of State v. DeBerry.1 -45 The opinion stated that
[t]he term "neglect," as defined by W.Va. Code, 61-8D-1(6)
[1988], is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process
principles contained in U.S. Const. amend. XIV, Sec. 1, and
W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10. Therefore, W.Va. Code, 61-8D-4(b)
[1988] is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process
principles contained in U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and W.Va.
Const. art. III, § 10, because such statute's use of the term
"neglect" gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his or her contemplated conduct is prohibited and it also provides
adequate standards for adjudication.1" 6

1540

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

1541

491 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1997).

1542

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

1543

460 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va.1995).

1544

Id. at Syl. PL 2.

1545

408 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

1546
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